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Using tariffs as a measure of openness, this paper finds consistent 
evidence that the conditional effects of trade liberalization on inequality 
are correlated with relative factor endowments. Trade liberalization is 
associated with increases in inequality in countries well-endowed in highly 
skilled workers and capital or with workers that have very low education 
levels and in countries relatively well-endowed in mining and fuels. Trade 
liberalization is associated with decreases in inequality in countries that 
are well-endowed with primary-educated labor. Similar results are also 
apparent when decile data are used instead of the usual Gini coefficient. 
The results are strongly supportive of the factor-proportions theory of 
trade and suggest that trade liberalization in poor countries where the 
share of the labor force with very low education levels (likely employed in 
non-tradable activities) is high raises inequality. In our sample, 
countries with very low education levels also have relatively scarce 
endowments of capital. Quantitatively capital scarcity is the dominating 
effect so that trade liberalization is accompanied by reduced income 
inequality in low-income countries. Within-country inequality is also 
positively correlated with measures of macroeconomic instability. 
Simulation results suggest that relatively small changes in inequality as 
measured by aggregate measures of inequality like the Gini coefficient are 
magnified when estimates are carried out using decile data.    
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1. Introduction   
 
The relation between openness, inequality and poverty within 
countries continues to be subject to considerable controversy 
in the debate about globalization and in the academic 
literature where the relative importance of the different 
transmission channels linking openness to inequality and 
poverty remains elusive. First, detailed case studies 
decomposing the sources of the evolution of income inequality 
within countries reveal very different patterns across 
countries. As to trade liberalization and openness--usually 
understood to mean the ease with which goods and services and 
factors of production (e.g. capital, labor and skills) move 
across countries as transaction costs fall-—they are often 
used interchangeably and captured by a trade-to-GDP ratio 
which captures many other features of a country’s exposure to 
trade. Second, whether from specific trade liberalization 
episodes or from cross-country studies, the evidence on the 
relation between trade liberalization and inequality is 
conflicting.
1 Third, in most cross-country studies, 
identification comes from cross-country variability in the 
inequality measure and no attempt is made to control for the 
source of the data on inequality.  
If one were asked to point towards an emerging consensus, 
it would probably be that increasing openness has been 
reflected in a growing wage gap between skilled and unskilled 
wages. Moving to the association between openness and overall 
                     
1 Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig eds. (2005, table 10.1) show the variety 
of underlying changes in inequality across four countries. Using four 
household surveys spanning the period of Mexican tariff liberalization, 
Nicita (2004) explores systematically the channels by which the Mexican 
trade liberalization affected households. He finds differential pass-
through effects across commodities and strong effects on spatial inequality 
and concludes that, overall, tariff liberalization might have been 
associated with a reduction in poverty, but that inequality increased. Case 
study evidence is not considered further in this paper. Also see Galiani 
and Porto (2006) for a country study on trade liberalization and wage 
inequality in Argentina.   3
inequality (usually measured by the Gini coefficient) the 
evidence remains very mixed: many studies find no evidence of 
openness on inequality, or that openness increases inequality 
at all levels of development.
2 
  More intriguing to many is the lack of robustness towards 
expectations from the standard Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) trade 
model: conflicting evidence that greater openness reduces 
(increases) inequality in developing (developed) countries and 
very qualified support for the hypothesis that endowments 
matter along the expected lines (see below), not to mention 
little support for robust results between trade liberalization 
and inequality.
3 One might also add that the lack of 
correlation between factor endowments and inequality should 
come as a surprise to scholars working on the institutional 
foundations of development who generally find strong evidence 
that endowments matter in the evolution of a country’s 
inequality (Hoff (2004)).  
  Perhaps this should not come as a surprise and not 
concern us too much if, via other channels such as growth, 
increased openness reduces poverty. After all, HO theory 
should only be expected to inform us about the relation 
between endowments and factor rewards in response to a reform-
induced change in relative factor demands rather than between 
endowments and overall income inequality which is determined 
by many other factors. And, as pointed out by Baldwin (2004, 
p. 517) in his review of the trade liberalization and growth 
literature, since trade liberalization is rarely applied in 
isolation, it makes little sense to try and isolate its 
effects from those of associated policies.  
                     
2 Barro (2000), Lundberg and Squire (2003) and Milanovic (2005) find that 
openness increases inequality whereas Edwards (1997), Ravallion (2001) or 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) find no significant relationship.   
3 See Anderson (2005) for a survey of the conflicting evidence on openness 
and inequality, and Winters et al. (2004) for a survey of the evidence on 
trade liberalization and poverty. Spilimbergo et al. (1999), Milanovic 
(2005) and Bensidoun et al. (2005) are the studies most closely related to 
ours.     4
In contrast to this agnosticism, following an exhaustive 
review of the evidence on trade liberalization and poverty, 
Winters et al. (2004, p. 108) conclude that trade 
liberalization might be the easiest poverty-alleviating reform 
to accomplish, and the most powerful direct mechanism to 
alleviate poverty in a country. If so, knowing more about the 
links between trade policy and inequality is important since, 
from a political-economy perspective, knowledge about the 
links between openness and inequality will inform about the 
feasibility of policies that increase openness and are likely 
to reduce poverty. 
  We bring new evidence on this issue using two data sets 
covering a larger sample of developing countries than most 
previous studies. We introduce fixed-effects (FE) so that 
identification of the effects of globalization is confined to 
variations in that country’s variables. We also broaden as 
much as possible the range of control variables to address 
endogeneity concerns (i.e. controlled for having another 
omitted variable jointly determining inequality and the right-
hand-side variables). In this set up, we find rather 
consistently that trade liberalization is associated with 
increases in inequality. Second, unlike most previous studies, 
we find that endowments matter along the lines suggested by 
the standard HO theory arguments reviewed in section 2. We 
find consistently that trade liberalization increases 
inequality in countries that are relatively well-endowed with 
capital and with highly skilled workers while it decreases 
inequality in countries relatively well-endowed in primary 
educated (unskilled) workers. On the other hand, as suggested 
by Wood (1994, 2002), we find that trade liberalization 
increases inequality in countries relatively well-endowed with 
workers lacking basic education.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses 
the main channels linking openness and trade liberalization to   5
inequality identified in the literature along with the two 
data sets used in this paper. Using data over the period 1980-
2000, section 3 establishes that the correlation between trade 
liberalization and inequality follows patterns predicted by 
factor-proportions theories. These results are largely 
confirmed with a ‘high quality’ data set (based on deciles) 
covering the period 1988-98 in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Transmission Channels and Data 
 
2.1 Transmission Channels 
The debate on the channels through which openness might affect 
inequality has largely revolved around the role of openness-
induced changes in relative factor demands and their 
consequent expected effects on factor rewards. For natural-
resource-rich countries, though they do not deal directly with 
trade liberalization, Leamer et al. (1999), provide plausible 
scenarios and some evidence as to why the development paths of 
such countries could lead to rising inequality.  
  Concentrating on accumulable endowments where rent 
effects should be minimal, Wood (2002) provides a convenient 
summary of the different channels via which globalization 
might affect wage inequality (see also Kremer and Maskin 
(2003)). As all forms of transaction costs fall with 
globalization, factor mobility (capital via FDI and Northern 
K-workers in the terminology of Wood) is enhanced, leading to 
greater cooperation of Northern K-workers who travel to work 
with skilled workers in the South. In the South, workers with 
little or no-education (and hence low wages) would then be 
expected to be confined to non-traded activities. Trade 
liberalization would then not only lead to rising wages for 
skilled workers in the North and in the South, but under   6
plausible assumptions, it would also lead to an increase in 
wage inequality in the South.
4  
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) interpret globalization as an 
increase in FDI (rather than a movement of K-workers) leading 
to a rising volume of trade in intermediates (see Hummels et 
al. (2001) for supporting evidence) as the process of 
production leads to a fragmentation of production. Again, in a 
HO framework where a continuum of intermediates are produced 
by the North and the South, and where the North is relatively 
well-endowed in skilled labor and capital (with capital and 
skilled labor complementary factors in production), Feenstra 
and Hanson, echoing Wood, show that an increase in FDI can 
lead to rising wages for skilled workers in the North and the 
South as FDI raises the skill-intensiveness of production in 
both countries.
5  
In reality, other channels beyond changes in factor 
rewards will affect inequality when a country becomes more 
outward-oriented. At the simplest level, in the Ricardo-Viner 
model changes in relative prices lead to changes in the 
purchasing-power of households, and if the poor consume the 
exported good intensively, trade liberalization could increase 
income inequality. Several exercises using simulation models 
reported in Hertel and Winters eds. (2006) quantify the 
potential magnitude of some of these channels, notably the 
                     
4 In a two-sector model (tradables and non-tradables) with capital and two 
categories of workers (skilled and unskilled), in which the three household 
categories are not diversified in their factor-ownership holdings and the 
unskilled are confined to the non-tradable sector, Bensidoun et al. (2005) 
show formally that an increase in the wage of skilled labor (brought about 
by increased openness) will raise the value of the Gini index if the share 
of unskilled labor is large enough.  
5 Arguing that much trade is between rich countries and that much trade can 
be viewed as the production of a single product manufactured by outsourcing 
of components made and assembled in different countries, Kremer and Maskin 
(2003) develop a model in which globalization (again an increase in FDI) 
can plausibly lead to an increasing wage gap between skilled and unskilled 
workers in both the North and the South. The key mechanism in their model 
is that globalization leads to more cross-matching than self-matching 
(workers with the same skill levels working together).    7
poverty implications of tariff reductions on the purchasing 
power of households with different expenditure patterns. 
More importantly, there are other context-specific 
transmission channels (see Winters et al. 2004 for discussion) 
which cannot be captured in a cross-country exercise seeking 
to extract common elements that are likely to hold across a 
range of countries. For example, as shown by Nicita (2004) in 
his detailed case study of tariff liberalization in Mexico 
during the 90s, price pass-through effects were substantially 
different across commodities, and the poverty effects of trade 
liberalization varied substantially across regions.  
 
2.2 Framework and Data  
Using panel data, the literature has usually estimated a 
relation of the form: 
  11 it it it i l it it
l
INQ D Y OPEN Z α βδ ε + =+   + + ∑  (1) 
where  it INQ  is the measure of inequality,  it Y  is average income 
per capita (either from the national accounts or from 
household surveys),  it OPEN  is a measure (eventually lagged to 
control for endogeneity) that proxies for the country’s 
outward-orientation
6, and  it Z  is a vector of control variables. 
In the discussion above, there is no role for income as an 
explanatory variable. Its inclusion rests on some variant of a 
Kuznets-type relationship, but also for structural changes 
(other than endowments but including increased financial 
integration) that are associated with rising GDP per capita 
and could affect the transmission of globalization-related 
effects to households.  
In all specifications we include a set of country 
dummies, i D , that eliminate all cross-country variation.  
                     
6 Greater outward-orientation goes beyond integration in goods markets. It 
includes integration in capital markets, as well as behind-the-border 
measures. Insofar as a reduction in transaction costs affect countries 
equally, these can be ignored. See further discussion below.   8
The use of country fixed-effects has usually not been the 
practice in previous studies. For example, in their widely 
cited study examined below, Spilimbergo et al.(1999) do not 
control for country-specific features that could account for 
differences in inequality such as labor market specificities 
emphasized by Rama (2002)), productivity differences (see 
Easterly (2004)), or institutions (Barro 2000). Nor do more 
recent studies (e.g. Milanovic (2005)) typically use such 
controls for heterogeneity.
7 Insofar as omitted factors do not 
change over time, the inclusion of fixed effects controls for 
such idiosyncratic factors. Since our data set covers a rather 
long period, and inevitably some of the relevant omitted 
variables will change over time, this needs to be kept in mind 
when interpreting results. Likewise, the validity of the 
results rests on the assumption that the data reflect a 
sufficiently stable relationship (this is why we exclude all 
transition economies from our samples) and that the same 
dynamics can be imposed on all countries, an assumption that 
is less likely to hold, but about which little can be done. 
We use two data sets. The first set of results are based on 
five-year average data spanning the 1980-2000 period relying 
on the extensively used Deininger and Squire (D-S) data set 
(augmented to include the year 2000 by the availability of the 
WIDER (2004) data). The second is the more recent high-quality 
data set World Income Distribution (WYD) also at approximately 
five-year intervals which covers the 1988-1998 period. Using 
two data sets provides further robustness checks, and the 
second data set is helpful when trying to quantify effects of 
trade liberalization on poverty. Table 1 shows that our sample 
                     
7 Among the studies that control for heterogeneity, Edwards (1997, 43 
countries, 70s and 80s) finds no evidence that openness or trade 
liberalization increases inequality. When including fixed effects, Barro 
(2000, 84 countries for 1960-90, table 6) finds no correlation between 
inequality and openness, echoing Ravallion’s correlations between average 
household incomes and inequality across 117 growth spells (Ravallion 
(2001), table 1).    9
has a good representation across regions, and that developing 
countries are adequately represented.
8 
 
Regarding the variable used to capture a country’s 
outward-orientation, we use lagged tariffs i.e.  ,5 it TAR − , 
(computed as the ratio of tariff revenues to imports) as a 
measure of trade openness. This is a more direct measure of 
openness than those often used previously (i.e. a trade output 
ratio, a ‘trade adjusted ratio’ obtained as a residual from an 
estimated relation of openness, or the Sachs-Warner index). As 
a consequence, our sample does not include the 1960-80 period 
covered in some of the earlier studies. Since most trade 
liberalization in developing countries started in the early 
1980s, this may not be too damaging (Table 2). 
 
Table 2a gives regional averages for the two main 
variables of interest, the inequality measure and our measure 
of openness, tariffs computed from customs data (see the annex 
for data sources and data manipulations). Table 2a shows 
little variation in the average measure of inequality within 
regions and persistent differences across regions while the 
measure of protection indicates (on average) a downward trend 
in all regions except Africa. Since much of the trade reforms 
in the 1980s often consisted of replacing NTBs by tariffs, 
what appears as an increase in protection could in fact 
represent either a reduction, or no increase in protection. In 
selecting tariffs as our measure of openness, we take refuge 
in the often-made observation that, on average, the average 
tariff level is an adequate approximation of the 
restrictiveness of a country’s trade regime, and arguably less 
                     
8 Only countries with economy-wide inequality measures (‘high-quality’ 
indices according to D-S) are retained in the sample. As a reference for 
comparison among the studies that concentrate on openness and inequality, 
the often-cited study by Spilimbergo et al. had 17 developed and 17 
developing countries in their sample.   10
controversial than other measures often used.
9 Of course, 
having a measure of tariff spreads across industries or 
between agriculture and manufactures would be helpful. 
Unfortunately such data are not available for a sufficiently 
large sample of countries. However, as shown by Pritchett and 
Sethi (1994), because of widespread exemptions, tariff 
revenues do not increase proportionately with tariff rates 
suggesting limited further information from having information 
on tariff spreads.  
Figure 1 describes the main characteristics of the data 
at the regional level. The relative patterns of inequality 
remain unchanged across regional groupings, being the highest 
in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa throughout. Within 
regions, tariff dispersion fell and, except for the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region, average tariffs declined 
during the sample period. 
As a check on the use of tariffs as a proxy for openness, 
table 2b gives the correlation between our measure and others 
frequently used, starting with the trade share in GDP (column 
1). It is clear that the correlation with the often-used GDP 
trade ratio is very low, but also with the black market 
premium and the index used by Spilimbergo et al. On the other 
hand, reassuringly, the correlation with the carefully 
constructed Wacziarg and Welch (2003) index is quite high.
10 
                     
9 According to Rodrik (2000), (p. 3): “Tariff and non-tariff averages are 
reasonably accurate in ranking countries in terms of trade policy openness, 
and in showing changes in openness over time”. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) 
reach the same conclusions and conclude that tariffs capture relatively 
well the combined effects of trade policy changes. They also note that the 
preoccupation about the endogeneity of tariffs is lessened by the fact that 
many countries moved towards a reduction in protection and more uniformity 
in their tariff structures when they became full members of the GATT/WTO. 
Moreover, the use of a synthetic index to measure of a trade regime still 
has appeal especially during the 70s and 80s when many countries still had 
a multiplicity of trade barriers in their foreign exchange regimes. 
10 Tariffs are also strongly positively correlated with other measures of 
trade barriers such as taxes on input and capital used by Barro & Lee 
(2002). Among the model-based estimates, tariffs are most closely 
correlated with the gravity-based index of Hiscox & Kastner (2002) and the 
residuals from adjusted trade ratios estimated econometrically by Leamer 
(1987), but weakly with the Pritchett (1997) index.   11
Even though these comparisons are comforting for those wishing 
to use tariffs as a rough indicator of the overall 
restrictiveness of a trade regime, it still remains that the 
strongest justification for their use is their widespread 
availability and the likelihood that error measurements will 
be less than with other proposed measures.
11  
The main weakness in the data set is the absence of a 
measure of financial openness. Miniane (2004) provides a 
summary of available indices of financial market integration. 
It turns out that even for the WYD data set which only covers 
the 1988-98 period, about 2/3 of the countries in our data set 
would not have a measure of financial market integration. We 
have therefore decided not to tackle the issue of financial 
market integration (using FDI as in e.g. Milanovic (2005), 
would not be appropriate since it is largely an outcome 
variable).  
 
3. Trade Liberalization and Inequality: Endowments matter 
 
We start exploring the basic HO prediction that trade 
liberalization should reduce inequality in low-income 
countries and increase it in high-income countries. Next, we 
bring in factor endowments which we interact with the tariff 
variable to isolate the effects of differing endowments on 
inequality. Throughout this section, the data cover the period 
1980-2000 and the Gini coefficient is the inequality measure. 
 
3.1 Openness, Income and Inequality 
 
We start with the traditional specification: 
                     
11 Because tariffs do not take into account NTBS, we also correlated several 
frequency indices of NTBs with our tariff measure at the HS-6 level using 
Jon Haveman’s treatment of TRAINS data. Correlations (available upon 
request) for different tariff ranges and the overall NTB frequency index 
ranges between 0.20 and 0.30 confirming high tariffs barriers are 




,5 ,5 11 2




          
it i t i t it it i
it li t k i k t
lk










In(2), the index of inequality is regressed on a set of 
country dummies  i D , on income per capita measured in PPP,  it Y , 
tariffs (lagged one-period to control for endogeneity)
12, 
,5 it TAR − , dummy variables,  ikt DS , to control for the source of 
inequality data (dummy variables for gross vs. net income, 
income vs. expenditure, and households vs. individuals), and 
on a set of control variables, it Z . All the variables are 
expressed in logarithms. As mentioned above, all data are five 
year averages (this helps to control for autocorrelation and 
measurement error), giving us four observations across time. 
The use of country fixed-effects reduces considerably the 
variance in inequality to be explained so that measurement 
errors are exacerbated. Taking 5 years averages helps, though 
imposing the same dynamics on all variables increases 
measurement errors (see Pritchett (2001)). Having more data 
points within countries, as in e.g. Galani and Porto (2006) 
who study the trade-liberalization wage-inequality relation in 
Argentina over 30 years would clearly be a superior 
identification strategy, but such an option is not yet in the 
cards. Robustness checks and the use of an alternative data 
set in section 4 seem the best options currently available. 
Should an increase in openness (here lower values for 
5 it TAR − ) raise inequality, it would be reflected in  1 ˆ 0 β < , while 
the relationship expected from a ‘basic’ HO interpretation 
(with capital and labor as the sole endowments) would call for 
12 ˆˆ 0, 0 ββ ><  since lowering tariffs in high-income countries 
                     
12 We also checked for reverse causality by regressing the Gini on forward 
tariffs, obtaining a non-significant coefficient suggesting that reverse 
causality is not a problem.   13







Results in the first three columns of Table 3, with no 
fixed effects, correspond to those usually found in the 
literature (e.g. Barro (2000), Ravallion (2001), Rama (2002)). 
Under this specification, trade liberalization raises 
inequality in poor countries, but reduces it in rich countries 
(i.e. with income per capita higher than 6,215$ in column 1 
and higher than 7,182$ in column 2), in contradiction with HO 
expectations. The relation is robust to the addition of other 
controls (column 2).  
Adding dummy variables for the source of income 
inequality data improves considerably the fit, while the 
results contrary to HO predictions continue to hold (though 
the turning point is now 4,279$). The signs on the dummies are 
always as expected with the Gini coefficients based on income 
being higher than those based on expenditure. Our first 
finding is that all studies should control for the source of 
income inequality data (a point already made by Ravallion 2001 
and Bensidoun et al. 2005)). Since the coefficients on these 
dummies are always similar to those in this table, we do not 
comment on this aspect any further.  
Column 4 introduces fixed-effects (FE) into the 
estimation. Now, the HO predictions hold, though they are 
still insignificant. However, with a GLS estimator to correct 
for heteroskedasticity
13 in the coefficient estimates (and in 
their variance), the coefficients are significant at the 1% 
level (with a reduction in protection increasing inequality 
                     
13 The Breusch Pagan test and the White test indicate heteroskedasticity in 
the error process (σ
2
it≠ σ
2). In case we would have only intra individual 
heteroskedasticity we could just perform a White correction on standard 





t), we preferred to use a GLS estimator which 
corrects estimates as well as standard errors. This estimator is more 
efficient in case of inter individual heteroskedasticity.   14
when income per capita exceeds 4,363$. Our second conclusion 
is that results from studies that do not control for effects 
of omitted variables via FE are likely to be biased.  
This reversal between OLS and OLS with FE can be 
understood from the data patterns in figure 1. Since the 
richest countries (OCDE) have the smallest tariffs and the 
lowest level of inequality through time while SSA countries 
have the lowest income par capita, the highest tariffs and the 
highest level of inequality, a level estimation will show that 
countries with low tariffs and high income per capita will 
have the lowest income inequality. However, such a 
relationship does not account for the impact of trade 
liberalization on inequality.  
Finally, while the possibility of a spurious relation 
still persists, one of the strong candidates for the observed 
relation would be that changes in inequality due to a 
successful stabilization policy would be attributed to 
increased openness because of a positive correlation between 
trade liberalization and concurrent stabilization policies. As 
shown by Wacziarg and Welch (2003), trade liberalization often 
occurs during periods of systemic reforms including macro 
stabilization. The sign and significance for the variables 
capturing the effects of other ongoing reforms confirm earlier 
findings (e.g. Dollar and Kraay (2002), Edwards (1997)) since 
stabilization--here proxied by a reduction in inflation--
reduces inequality.
14 However, including this control does not 
alter the relationship. The results are also robust to the 
inclusion of the other control variables
15. 
                     
14 We have not considered the possibility that inflation could be endogenous 
(e.g. Romer (1993) gives evidence that inflation is lower in open 
economies). 
15 Several factors previously found to be correlated with inequality have 
the expected coefficients in our formulation: ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation and less civil liberties increases inequality; financial 
depth and a high share of mature worker both reduce inequality. Spurious 
correlation from omitted variable bias could still be present. For example, 
trade liberalization could increase investment (see evidence in Wacziarg 
and Welch (2003)) which in turn could be correlated with inequality. Barro   15
 
3.2. Trade Liberalization, Endowments, and Inequality 
We now add relative endowments. As in previous studies, these 
are interacted with the openness measure as in previous 
studies (e.g. Bourguignon and Morrisson (1990), Spilimbergo et 
al. (1999) and Fisher (2001)). This allows us to test whether 
the conditional correlation of protection on inequality is 
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As suggested by HO theory, relative endowment ratios, mit RE , are 
computed relative to the sample mean per capita endowment. The 
ratios are weighted by the trade share in GDP to account for 
the endowments of closed countries that do not compete in the 
world markets with other factors (to help comparisons, we use 
the formula in Spilimbergo et al., see annex A4). Since we 
include fixed effects, we now have a reduced vector of control 
variables (i.e. we drop ethno-linguistic fragmentation, the 
share of mature workers and civil liberties, all of which are 
nearly time invariant).  
As a first exercise, we replicated the same specification 
as Spilimbergo et al. confirming their results (i.e. a result 
in conformity with HO for human capital but in contradiction 
with HO for physical capital—see table A5) when using their 
openness variable (‘adjusted’ trade ratio instead of tariffs). 
However, when using tariffs, the results are much closer to 
those expected from HO theory, namely that increases in 
inequality are associated with strong endowments in capital 
following a reduction in tariffs. To our knowledge, this 
                                                                
(2000) finds little correlation between inequality, and growth and 
investment in his sample, but Lundberg and Squire (2003) find support for a 
link in a simultaneous examination of inequality and growth.   16
plausible set of results has not been found in previous 
studies. However, with tariffs, the significance of human 
capital endowments disappears. 
These results suggest that it might be fruitful to break 
down labor into three categories: non-educated, i.e. those who 
have never been to school or have not completed primary school 
(NO-ED);  primary-educated or labor with a basic education 
(BS-ED); and those that have an education level beyond high-
school (SK-ED). Such a breakdown is suggested by the 
discussion in section 2, and was carried out recently by 
Bensidoun et al. (2005) in a slightly different context.
16 The 
index of human capital endowment (average years of schooling) 
is now replaced by these three different categories of skill 
levels. We take the NO-ED variable from the Barro and Lee 
(2000) data set which is available on a five-year basis that 
corresponds to the 5-year averages used for all our variables. 
As shown in Table 4, a convenient way to include these 
three levels of education is in ratio form: (SK-ED)/(BS-ED) 
and (SK+BS)/(NO-ED)
17. We expect that during a trade 
liberalization, countries with a relatively (to the sample 
average) strong endowment in (SK-ED)/(BS-ED) to experience an 
increase in inequality, while, after having controlled for 
skill endowments, we would expect that countries relatively 
well-endowed in (SK+BS)/(NO-ED) would experience a decrease in 
inequality during a trade liberalization. 
                     
16 Bensidoun et al. argue that the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model is too 
restrictive, relying on factor-price-equalization (FPE) and hence identical 
production techniques in equilibrium. Using a more general approach that 
relaxes the FPE assumption (but still relies on other restrictive 
assumptions like homothetic preferences and unchanged production techniques 
following trade liberalization), they show that factor price changes are 
correlated with the factor content of trade, leading them to test their 
model using constructed estimates of the labor-capital content of net 
exports instead of factor endowments on a similar D-S inequality data set 
for 53 countries. However, their results are not strictly comparable with 
ours (different sample with no SSA countries, the use of PPP per capita GDP 
for NOED in most specifications, and a different definition of variables). 
17 Thanks to Adrian Wood for this suggestion.   17
As to remaining endowments, Wood (2003) suggests that 
arable land per worker (AT/L) (as in Spilimbergo et al., 
Fisher (2001) or Leamer et al. (1999)) is not sufficient to 
encompass natural resources and suggests using land per worker 
(T/L). Whereas arable land per worker captures factor 
intensities in the production of food and raw materials, it 
does not include mining and fuels which are the less equally-
distributed resources. This may explain why several studies 
find that endowment in arable land does increases inequality 
during trade liberalization (Spilimbergo et al. and Perry and 
Olarreaga (2006)). Our preferred specification uses a direct 
measure of endowments in mining and fuels (MF/L captured by 
production in minerals, fuels and coal), next to the measure 
of arable land.  
In column 1 we include labor with no education (NO-ED)/L. 
The results show that inequality is greater in countries with 
a high share of (NO-ED)/L and that trade liberalization 
increases income inequality more for countries abundant in NO-
ED. The results also suggest that trade liberalization raises 
inequality more for capital abundant countries, which conforms 
to HO predictions, again a result that eluded previous 
studies. 
As expected, replacing in column 2 (NO-ED)/L by the 
primary-educated ratio, (BS-ED)/L, reverses the results: trade 
liberalization decreases inequality for primary-educated 
abundant countries if indeed they represent a large share of 
poor (we explore further the links between trade 
liberalization and poverty in section 4). Again, as expected 
by HO theory, trade liberalization increases inequality in 
capital abundant countries. Robustness to HO predictions still 
holds when one replaces the primary educated, (BS-ED)/L, by 
the highly-educated, (SK-ED)/L, in column 3 as trade 
liberalization increases inequality in highly-educated 
abundant countries. This result is consonant with Galiani and   18
Porto’s identification of an increasing skill premium in 
periods of trade liberalization in Argentina. 
Though weaker, the pattern of results still holds when we 
include two kinds of skills , (SK+BS)/(NO-ED) and (SK-ED)/(BS-
ED) in column 4 both of which enter with the expected signs (a 
strong endowment in (SK-ED)/(BS-ED) is associated with more 
inequality while the opposite holds for (SK+BS)/(NO-ED)). As 
to natural resources, adding mining and fuels (MF/L) in column 
5 reveals a positive correlation between trade liberalization 
and inequality in countries well-endowed in (MF/L), results 
echoing those of Perry and Olarreaga (2006). This last 
specification seems to best capture the interactions between 
trade liberalization and factor endowments. 
Table 5 quantifies the effects of a 5 percentage points 
reduction in tariffs on Gini coefficient value for different 
quartiles of the distribution of endowments. As, an example, 
tariff reduction reduces the value of the Gini coefficient by 
1.3% for countries in the bottom quartile of the distribution 
of (K/L), while it increases inequality by 0.9% for those in 
the top quartile. A similar pattern holds for (SK-ED)/(BS-ED), 
with the strongest effect for the ratio (SK+BS)/(NO-ED)). 
Since countries with a high share of non-educated population 
are also likely to be poorly endowed in capital, the two 
effects will tend to cancel each other. 
We now summarize the results of several robustness checks 
(these are available in the corresponding annex tables). 
Regarding macroeconomic and institutional variables, we used 
those in Lopez (2003) (Table A8). Results show that original 
results are robust when using these controls with all the 
macroeconomic variables having the expected sign (e.g. an 
improvement in civil liberties or an increase in government 
expenditure decreases inequality).  
Not surprisingly, the results are less robust to the use 
the alternative indices of trade liberalization given in Table   19
2b, although sign patterns are close to those described here 
when we use the Hisocx and Kastner (2002) and Wacziarg and 
Welch (2003). Results are summarized in Table A9.  
Thirdly, we obtain similar results when we apply our 
preferred specification to quintile from the Wider database 
(45 countries instead of 61). Results are reported in Table 
A10. Finally, the results are also robust to the exclusion of 
a small number of observations signaled as outliers by a test 
on residuals, and the pattern of signs is broadly similar when 
developed countries are excluded from the sample. 
 
4. Openness, Inequality and Poverty: Further Results  
 
Arguably, in spite of controls for the type of survey, the 
data set used so far is of lesser quality than the more recent 
World Income Distribution (WYD)
18 data set that is drawn almost 
entirely from household surveys thereby allowing us to define 
welfare aggregates and recipient units consistently across 
countries and time. The WYD data set which also provides 
information on income levels by deciles presents two 
advantages. First, it allows us to check for the robustness of 
our results in general, and also to the choice of inequality 
measure since we can work directly with decile data. Second, 
it is more appropriate to carry out estimates of the effects 
of trade liberalization on inequality and especially on 
poverty, both because the quality of the data is presumably 
higher, but also because the calculations can also be carried 
out directly from the household sample mean income per 
capita, it m , rather than from GDP per capita from national 
accounts.
19 
                     
18 WYD can be downloaded from http://econ.worldbank.org/projects/inequality. 
19 It has been argued that income measures from household survey data that 
is representative of the entire economy is a more reliable estimate of GDP 
than the corresponding measures from the national accounts. In particular, 
even though survey-based estimates of income have their own problems, 
Deaton (2005) argues that: “If we need to measure poverty in a way that   20
Following the approach and specification in (3), we 
regress the share of the j-th decile in country i,  ij θ  (which 
is defined as the ratio between the absolute income of the j-
th decile,( ijt y ), and the sample mean income, ( it m ) on  ,5 it TAR − , 
the same set of relative endowments (REit), their interaction 
with  ,5 it TAR − ,and a set of controls (Zit). As before, (4) 
includes a set of country dummies and dummies to control for 
the source of inequality data leading to the following 






                              ( ) 
ijt
it i t ij i j j m imt
m it
i t ijt m imt jl ilt it
ml
y
Dm T A R R E
m












Table 6 reports the results for the bottom three and top 
three deciles (cf. full results in Table A11).
  
  Besides plausible estimates with the FE estimator 
(Milanovic (2005, footnote 8 argues that because this panel is 
very short there is insufficient data variability to use such 
an estimator), the following patterns stand out. First, the 
previous results are quite robust to the change of sample and 
to the use of decile data instead of the Gini coefficient. 
Except for the coefficient for the interaction term between 
tariffs and raw materials (which now turns out to be 
insignificant), all other coefficients related to tariffs have 
the same sign as in Table 4 and are significant. In 
particular, a reduction in protection is associated with 
increases in inequality since it reduces (increases) the 
                                                                
will convince those who are skeptical of the idea that average growth 
reaches the poor, there is little choice but to use the surveys”, p.18. See 
Deaton (2005) for a deeper discussion on this issue. In our sample the 
correlation between  H g  and  PPP g  is  0.2917 ρ = , and a regression on annual 
income growth (over 1988 and 1998) measured from the surveys,  H g , and from 
national income,  PPP g  is (std. errors in parenthesis): 
2
(0.357)
0.029 0.706 ; 0.0851 HP P P gg R =+ = . 
   21
income shares of the bottom (top) deciles. Moreover, this 
effect is accentuated in countries that are relatively 
abundant in capital (K/L) or in countries abundant in high 
skill labor (SK-ED)/(BS-ED). Increases in inequality continue 
to be correlated with reductions in tariffs in countries 
relatively well endowed in no educated people (SK+BS)/(NO-ED). 
On the other hand, this income-inequality increasing effect of 
trade liberalization is mitigated in countries abundant in 
arable land (AT/L). Finally, the control variables have the 
same effects as those discussed in section 3.
20 
These results were submitted to several robustness checks 
(see Tables in the appendix; others available upon request). 
First, we ran the same regression without taking the logarithm 
of the variables, obtaining similar results. Regarding reverse 
causality, we ran the same regression using future trade 
rather than past values and the results become mostly 
insignificant, suggesting that reverse causality should not be 
a problem here.
21 As to control variables, in other 
specifications, we added government expenditure and/or an 
index of democracy, resulting in a large reduction in sample 
size. With few exceptions, estimated values of variables of 
interest remained quite close to the estimates discussed above 
(see Table A12). In sum, the results based on decile data are 
robust and coherent with the results obtained earlier in Table 
6. 
Since the correlation between tariff reductions and 
inequality after controlling for endowments is still 
significant in this shorter time span, we used the coefficient 
estimates in Table 6 to simulate the average impact of a 5 
                     
20 We also compared the results obtained by using the Theil and Gini 
coefficients. In all cases except for (K/L) and the GDP per capita 
(measured here by the mean income), (whereas these two coefficients were 
not significant in table 4), the sign of Gini and Theil coefficients are 
the same. Moreover, in all cases (except for the ratio (SK/(BS-ED)) and the 
two interaction terms (K/L) * (Tariffs) and (RM/L) * (Tariffs), the 
coefficients are also significant. 
21 We thank Marcelo Olarreaga for this suggestion.   22
point decrease in tariffs (this corresponds to the average 
tariff reduction during that period) on the bottom and top 
three deciles for three aggregated developing ‘regions’: i) 
Sub-Saharan Africa (5 countries excluding South Africa), ii) 
Latin America (15 countries) and iii) East, South and South 
East Asia (11 countries excluding Japan & Singapore). In each 
case, regional values are values averaged over countries in 
the region
22. The results of this simulation exercise are 
reported in Table 7.  
For each region, the first row reports each decile’s 
share in income before and after the simulated reduction in 
tariff protection. Row 2 reports the corresponding mean 
incomes in $1993 PPP and row 3 shows the corresponding growth 
(over the period) that would be necessary to keep each 
decile’s income at its initial value. Note first that there is 
great variation in the sample size across regions. SSA only 
has 10 observations spread over 5 countries (implying a very 
unbalanced panel) while Latin America has 43 observations 
spread over 15 countries, an almost balanced panel. Hence the 
large magnitude of the results for SSA, which are driven by 
the very low K/L endowment ratio for that region, should be 
viewed most cautiously. As to Latin America and the combined 
Asia region, the patterns are quite similar. Regarding the 
interpretation of the compensatory growth that would be 
necessary to compensate for the adverse effect of trade 
liberalization on income inequality in Asia and Latin America, 
Wacziarg and Welch report an increase in average yearly growth 
(over a 7-year period) of 0.5 percentage points following the 
trade liberalizations in their sample suggesting that the 
growth-induced effects of trade liberalization would not be 
sufficient to compensate for the adverse distributional 
implications for the poorest quintile. 
                     
22 Because of the possibility of outliers and influential observations, we 
checked that the results in table 6 were not sensitive to the exclusion of 
outliers.   23
The well-known lack of sensitivity of aggregate measures 
of inequality to changes in the distribution of income is 
apparent when inspecting the changes in the values of the Gini 
coefficients reported in Table 7 (in spite of the large 
changes in mean decile incomes, Gini coefficient values only 
change by one percentage point). Because of the many biases 
likely to remain in these estimates in spite of the inclusion 
of many control variables, it is difficult to comment with 
confidence on the additional information provided by the 
detailed results on the decile data.   
As a further check of the orders of magnitude implied by 
the simulations reported in Table 7, figure 2 reports country-
level estimates of the simulated changes in the bottom and top 
quintiles of the distribution.
23 Several patterns emerge. 
First, as in Table 7, gains are mostly for SSA countries. 
Second, gains and losses in the bottom quintile are mostly 
reflected in changes in the top quintile rather than the 
middle of the distribution. Third, the linear specification 
implies much larger simulated changes in percentage terms for 
the bottom than for the top quintile. In interpreting these 
country-level results, one should recall that these are 
contingent on the validity of imposing the same reaction to 




Much of previous research on the correlates of inequality 
has established that inequality is largely determined by 
factors that are quite different across countries and that 
change only slowly within countries. Notably, the effects of 
changes in trade policies, and of globalization more 
                     
23 The simulations are based on average values over the period. Because of 
the inclusion of fixed effects in our estimations, actual values of mean 
quintile shares are extremely close to those reported in figure 2, 
obviating the need to comment on how the model fits the data.    24
generally, have been difficult to detect. This paper has 
focused exclusively on within-country variations to trade 
policy changes while carefully disaggregating factor 
endowments. Overall, the results suggest that changes in 
inequality are correlated with changes in tariffs which are 
quite robust to inclusion of various controls and to changes 
in sample periods. 
Three patterns emerge from these conditional 
correlations.  First, as suggested by factor-proportions 
theories of international trade, increases in inequality are 
positively correlated with trade liberalization in countries 
well-endowed in highly skilled workers and with workers that 
have very low education levels. Decreases in inequality are 
positively correlated with trade liberalization in countries 
that are well-endowed with primary-educated labor. Increases 
in inequality are positively correlated with trade 
liberalization in countries relatively well-endowed in mining 
and fuels production, assets which are very unequally 
distributed. Similar results are apparent when decile data are 
used instead of the usual Gini coefficient. Thus, if one 
extends the factor-proportions theory of trade to include a 
non-traded sector where those with minimal education are most 
likely to be employed, trade liberalization in poor countries 
where the share of the labor force with little education 
(workers that have not finished primary school) is high is 
likely associated with increases in inequality as is often 
pointed out by critics of globalization. Trade liberalization 
is also associated with increases in inequality in capital-
abundant and high-skill abundant countries so that trade 
liberalization only reduces inequality in countries abundant 
in unskilled labor. 
Second, the results on the pattern of signs are quite 
robust, and the addition of control variables yields plausible 
results. We find no evidence of reverse causality. Controlling   25
for the sources of income distribution data is always 
significant along expected lines. Finally, a reduction in 
macroeconomic instability (proxied by a reduction in 
inflation) also reduces within-country inequality. 
Third, simulations suggest potentially significant 
endowment-related effects associated with trade 
liberalization. Because of remaining biases, these estimates 
should be interpreted very cautiously, although we would argue 
that the relative robustness of the endowment effects to 
changes in specification justifies looking beyond averages and 
quantifying effects on the poor.      
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Table 1:  Countries in the sample
a  
 
  Sample for the study on 1980-2000  Sample for the study on 1988-1998 
Regions  Number of countries  Number of obs.  Number of countries  Number of obs. 
Developed 20  66  19  51 
Africa & Middle East  14  42  10  23 
Asia 10  36  11  29 
Latin American  17  54  15  43 
Total 61  198  55  146 
Notes: List of countries are reported in Annex 1 and 2. 
a Transition and ex-USSR countries are excluded. Countries with less than two observations are also dropped 
from the sample 
 
 
Table 2:  Data on Inequality and Openness 
 
Table 2a: Inequality and Tariffs  
 
Region Year Gini  Tariffs  Region  Year Gini  Tariffs 
1980 33.4 2.9  1980 47.6 10.6 
1985 31.8 2.1  1985 48.1 13.6 








1995 49.8  7.1 
1980 40.9 6.7  1980  42  19.8 
1985 40.7 8.1  1985 38.7 17.4 
1990 39.3 8.7  1990  38  19.1 
 
East Asia 




1995 37.7 12.2 
1980 35.7 19.1  1980 44.6 16.7 
1985 35.9 27.1  1985 46.7 18.2 
1990 36.2 25.3  1990 50.5 18.1 
 
South Asia 
1995 37.8 15.2 
 
Africa 
1995 46.3 17.9 
 
 
Table 2b: correlation across measure of openness 
 
 


















Observations 477  40 477  373  448 70  159  278 165 
Tariffs -0.15  -0.43  -0.08  -0.05  -0.56 -0.33  0.31  0.47  0.02   31
Figure 1:  Box Plots on Gini, Tariffs and GDP per capita ($PPP) : 1980 and 1995 
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Table 3:  Inequality, income and openness 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
 OLS  OLS  OLS  FE  GLS+FE 
Dependent  variable  lnGini lnGini lnGini lnGini lnGini 
GDPpc  -0.0509 -0.0595 -0.0527  0.0919 0.1298a 
  (1.30) (1.36) (1.58) (1.21) (5.46) 
Tariffst-5  -5.1998b  -5.3951b -4.3213b  2.9037  2.8789b 
  (2.28) (2.27) (2.07) (1.24) (2.46) 
Tariffst-5 * GDPpc  0.5953b  0.6076b  0.5168b  -0.3371  -0.3435b 
  (2.26) (2.18) (2.13) (1.22) (2.49) 
Education  0.0374 0.0820 0.0057 0.0418 -0.0233 
  (0.71) (1.24) (0.10) (0.46) (0.72) 
Mature  -0.4445a -0.2918a -0.4124a  0.0490  0.0018 
  (5.63) (3.52) (5.56) (0.32) (0.04) 
Ethnicity 0.0268b  0.0328a  0.0310a  0.0000  0.0030 
  (2.18) (2.62) (2.82)  (.)  (0.09) 
Civil Liberties  0.0518  0.0811c  0.0666c  0.0409  0.0690a 
  (1.23) (1.67) (1.74) (0.74) (4.13) 
Inflation 0.0629b  0.0123  0.0707a  0.0112  0.0187a 
  (2.04) (0.34) (3.36) (0.85) (2.87) 
M2/Gdp   -0.1163a      
   (3.26)      
Gov.  expenditure   0.0897b      
   (2.27)      
Gross/Net Income      0.0202  -0.0010  0.0049 
     (0.72)  (0.04)  (0.56) 
Income/expenditure     0.1785a  0.1102b  0.1248a 
     (4.52)  (2.60)  (8.24) 
Households/Individuals     -0.0240  0.0586b  0.0446a 
     (0.98)  (2.43)  (5.23) 
       
Fixed  Effects  No No No Yes  Yes 
       
Constant  5.2384a 5.0059a 4.9787a     
 (17.93)  (14.54)  (18.35)     
Observations  224 172 224 215  215 
R-squared  0.44 0.35 0.53  0.15  (0.91*)   
#  Countries  75 61 75 66  66 
 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1% 
 
* With fixed country effects   33
 
Table 4 Inequality, factor endowments and openness
 
 
  1 2  3  4  5 
  Gini  Gini Gini Gini Gini 
GDPpc  0.1401a 0.1006a 0.0227 0.1006a  0.0982a 
  (4.55)  (3.21) (0.92) (3.20) (3.06) 
MinFuel  per Labor   (MF/L)          0.1058a 
         (7.77) 
Ar. Land per Labor   (AT/L)  0.1177  0.0364  -0.0731  0.0583  -0.0036 
  (1.47)  (0.46) (1.07) (0.73) (0.04) 
Capital per Labor    (K/L)  -0.0231  -0.0119  -0.0526c  -0.0279  -0.0386 
  (0.65)  (0.34) (1.76) (0.83) (1.13) 
NoEd. per Labor ((NO-ED)/L)  0.0705a         
 (2.71)         
BasEd. per Labor  ((BS-ED)/L)    0.0093       
   (0.28)       
SkillEd. per Labor ((SK-ED)/L)      0.1194a     
     (6.50)    
(Sk..+ Base.Ed)/NoEd ((SK+BS)/NO-ED)        -0.1037a  -0.1380a 
       (5.52)  (7.85) 
Skill/Base Ed  (SK-ED/BS-ED)        0.1010a  0.0925a 
       (5.48)  (4.71) 
Tariffst-5 0.1537  0.0560  -0.1937  -0.0554  0.0292 
  (0.52)  (0.18) (0.76) (0.19) (0.10) 
(MF/L) *(Tariffst-5)         -0.1371c 
         (1.87) 
(AT/L) *(Tariffst-5) -0.2946  -0.1728  -0.0368  -0.1427  0.0451 
  (0.95)  (0.53) (0.15) (0.45) (0.13) 
(K/L)  *(Tariffst-5) -0.3619a  -0.3754a  0.2262c  -0.2138c  -0.2233c 
  (3.44)  (3.29) (1.78) (1.79) (1.80) 
((NO-ED)/L)  *(Tariffst-5) -0.6581b         
 (2.06)         
((BS-ED)/L) *(Tariffst-5)   0.4821b       
   (2.07)       
((SK-ED)/L) *(Tariffst-5)     -0.6010a     
     (4.75)    
((SK+BS)/NO-ED)*(Tariffst-5)       0.8495a  1.0653a 
       (4.54)  (6.28) 
(SK-ED/BS-ED) *(Tariffst-5)       -0.9153a  -0.8764a 
       (5.63)  (5.31) 
          
Inflation  0.0218a 0.0232a  0.0106c 0.0110 0.0116c 
  (3.11)  (3.30) (1.66) (1.62) (1.66) 
Gross/Net Income  -0.0189c  -0.0160c  -0.0300a  -0.0130  -0.0145 
  (1.74)  (1.67) (4.72) (1.16) (1.31) 
Income/Expenditure  0.1221a  0.1181a 0.1138a 0.1042a 0.1063a 
  (8.13)  (7.96) (8.23) (6.76) (6.67) 
Households/Individual  0.0497a  0.0538a 0.0584a 0.0351a 0.0418a 
 (6.82)  (7.32)  (25.67)  (5.48)  (8.02) 
Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  198  198 198 198 198 
#  Countries  61  61 61 61 61 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%   34
 












         
 
 
Variable Percentile  5 percentage points 
tariff reduction* 
(K/L)  0.25  -1.3 
  0.75  0.9 
(SK-ED/BS-ED)  0.25  -2.0 
  0.75  1.0 
((SK+BS)/NO-ED)  0.25  3.2 
  0.75  -5.9 
 
  * Percentage change in Gini coefficient   35
 
Table 6:  Inequality, factor endowments and openness 
 
 lnθ1 lnθ2 lnθ3 lnθ8 lnθ9 lnθ10 lngini 
Tariffst-5  12.1665a 5.0987a  2.3205a -0.4606a -0.6598a  -0.1584  -1.2703a 
 (7.23)  (7.88)  (5.33)  (3.91)  (4.12)  (0.44)  (4.26) 
Mean income  -0.2431a  -0.1385a  -0.1121a  -0.0441a  -0.0284a  0.1398a  0.1181a 
 (5.41)  (9.27)  (6.61)  (15.83)  (6.08)  (14.43)  (12.23) 
(K/L) 0.4322a  0.2548a  0.1208b  0.0605a  0.0420a  -0.2006a  -0.1481a 
 (4.47)  (6.10)  (2.56)  (8.17)  (3.62)  (8.15)  (4.71) 
(AT/L) 0.5842  0.1547  0.2295b  0.3923a  0.1908a  -0.6960a  -0.3510a 
 (1.52)  (1.06)  (2.02)  (11.50)  (3.27)  (7.59)  (3.88) 
(MF/L) -0.6935a  -0.2021a  -0.0904c  -0.0363a  -0.0146  0.1801a  0.1398a 
 (3.90)  (3.05)  (1.72)  (2.89)  (1.22)  (4.45)  (4.40) 
(SK-ED/BS-ED) -0.0676  -0.0362  -0.0342c  -0.0030  0.0332a  0.0080  0.0089 
 (0.98)  (1.62)  (1.80)  (0.39)  (4.17)  (0.37)  (0.46) 
((SK+BS)/NO-ED) 0.1776b  0.1308a  0.0826a  0.0065  -0.0329a  -0.0608a  -0.0633a 
 (2.35)  (4.49)  (3.24)  (0.97)  (5.09)  (2.82)  (3.24) 
(K/L) * (Tariffst-5) 3.6249a  1.3255a  0.6735a  -0.3809a  -0.3279a  0.3056c  -0.2167 
 (5.73)  (4.93)  (3.85)  (8.14)  (4.73)  (1.94)  (1.56) 
(AT/L) * (Tariffst-5) -9.8692a  -4.1584a  -1.9019a  0.1535c  0.4179a  0.4309  1.1732a 
 (5.75)  (6.60)  (4.21)  (1.88)  (2.88)  (1.59)  (4.07) 
(MF/L) * (Tariffst-5) -0.2151  0.0497  0.0154  0.0112  -0.0664  -0.0371  -0.0361 
 (0.45)  (0.28)  (0.13)  (0.24)  (1.31)  (0.43)  (0.43) 
(SK/(BS-ED)) * (Tariffst-5) 2.4942a  0.9503b  0.7164a  -0.0163  -0.0299  -0.6451a  -0.8820a 
 (3.66)  (2.51)  (2.76)  (0.22)  (0.36)  (5.14)  (5.86) 
((SK+BS)/NO-ED)*( Tariffst-5)  -2.1938a -0.8410a -0.6382a -0.1094b -0.1267c  0.5939a  0.6060a 
 (3.26)  (2.96)  (2.64)  (2.35)  (1.87)  (3.34)  (3.13) 
Inflation -0.1110b  -0.0449a  -0.0142  0.0076a  0.0063  0.0148c  0.0240a 
 (2.45)  (2.78)  (1.13)  (3.09)  (0.84)  (1.67)  (2.70) 
Income/expenditure -0.1214a  -0.1069a  -0.0588a  0.0030  0.0031  0.0217c  0.0385a 
 (2.83)  (5.57)  (4.74)  (0.55)  (0.48)  (1.65)  (4.12) 
Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 146  146  146  146  146  146  146 
# Countries  55  55  55  55  55  55  55 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%   36
 
Table 7:  Decile changes in income simulated from a 5 percentage points reduction in 
tariffs 
 
•  Sub-Saharan Africa  [0.464, 0.453]** 
 
Ghana (2)*, Lesotho (2), Kenya (2), Uganda (2), and Zimbabwe (2) 
 
    Decile  1  Decile  2  Decile 3  Decile 8  Decile 9  Decile  10 
A  1.9% - 2.5%  2.9% - 3.2%  3.9% - 4.1%  11.2% - 10.8%  15.6% - 15.2%  38.0% - 38.4% 








C  -2.7%  -1.0%  -0.7%  0.4% 0.3%  -0.1% 
 
 
•  Latin America  [0.482, 0.492]** 
 
Argentina (3), Bolivia (3), Brazil (3), Colombia (3), Costa Rica (3), Dominican Republic (3), 
Ecuador(3), Jamaica (3), Mexico (3), Nicaragua (2), Panama (3), Paraguay (2), Peru (3), Uruguay (3) 
and Venezuela (3) 
 
A  1.3% - 1.0%  2.5% - 2.3%  3.6% - 3.5%  11.6% - 11.7%  16.6% - 16.8%  38.0% - 38.3% 















C 2.0%  0.8%  0.4%  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1% 
 
 
•  East, South and South-East Asia  [0.358, 0.369]** 
 
Bangladesh (2), China (2), India (3), Indonesia (2), Korea (3), Malaysia (3), Pakistan (3), Philippines 
(3), Singapore (3), Sri Lanka (3) and Thailand (3) 
 
A  3.0% - 2.5%  4.3% - 3.9%  5.2% - 5.0%  11.6% - 11.7%  15.1% - 15.2%  29.6% - 29.9% 






C 2.1%  0.9%  0.4%  0.0%  -0.1%  -0.1% 
 
 
Row A corresponds to the relative shift of the share due to a 5 points decrease of tariffs.  
Row B corresponds to the shift of the absolute income of the share due to a 5 points decrease of tariffs. 
Row C shows the corresponding annual real growth (over the 10 years) that would be necessary to keep each 
decile’s income at its initial value. 
 
*Number of observations in parentheses. 
** Gini coefficients before and after simulated tariff reduction in brackets. 
   37
Figure 2: Simulated changes in quintile mean incomes of a 5 percentage points reduction in tariffs 
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* Simulated quintile share before tariff reduction on the horizontal axis, and changes in quintile share following 
the tariff reduction (here, a 5 percentage points) on the vertical axis. For example, the average income share of 
the poorest 20% of the Dominican Republic (DOM) is reduced from 4% of total income to 2% after the tariff 
reduction.  38
Annexes to: 
Trade Liberalization, Inequality, and Poverty: Endowments 
Matter 
Julien Gourdon, Nicolas Maystre, Jaime de Melo 
Annex 1:  List of countries included in the sample 1980-2000(Gini from WIDER)   








Costa Rica  4 




































































United States  4 
Total 20  66 
















Sierra Leone  1* 















































Total  10 (12*)  36 (38*) 
 
 
*  means that countries are excluded in our 
specifications with country fixed effects. 
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Annex 2:  List of countries included in the sample 1988-1998 (deciles from WYD)
 

































  Zimbabwe 2 





Costa Rica  3 









































Total  11  29 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    











































United States  3 
Total 19 51 
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Annex 3:  List of variables 
 
Label Content  Sources 
Gini  Gini coefficients  WIDER(2004) 
ShareX 
(X = 1,…, 10) 
Absolute income level of each decile normalized by the mean income. (X = 1 
corresponds to the poorest 10% of the population and X = 10 to the richest 
10%) 
WYD (2002)  
Mean  It corresponds to the mean income derived from  household surveys (in 
current $PPP) 
WYD (2002) 
GDPpc  GDP per capita in power parity purchase (PPP)  Pen WorldTables (2005) 
Capital   Capital per Worker  Easterly and Levine (1999)  & 
Kraay and al. (2000) 
Land  Land per labor force 
Land arable per labor force 
Crop Land per Labor force /Cereal Land per Labor force/Forest Land per 
Labor Force 
WDI (2004) 
Mining & Fuel   Production of minerals, coal and Oil  World Energy Council (2004) 
Education  Average years of schooling  in the population over 15 years old  Barro and Lee (2000) 
No Educated  Proportion of the population over 15 years non educated  (or primary not 
completed) 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
Primary (Based) 
Educated 
Proportion of the population over 15 years primary educated (completed) (or 
secondary not completed) 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
High (Skilled) 
Educated 
Proportion of the population over 15 years High educated  Barro and Lee (2000) 
Inflation  Annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator. The GDP implicit deflator 
is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local 
currency. 
WDI (2004) 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment as % of Gdp.  UNCTAD Handbook of Int. Trade 
and Development Statistics (1996, 
1997, 2000) 
M2/Gdp  Money and quasi money comprise  as % of Gdp.  WDI (2004) 
Gov Expenditure  Total expenditure includes both current and capital expenditures as % of 
Gdp 
WDI (2004) 
Mature  Share of the population between 40 and 59 years old  Higgins and Williamson (1999) 
Civil Liberties  Measure the extent to which people are able to express their 
opinion openly without fears of reprisals and are protected in doing 
so by an independent judiciary. 
Freedom House 
Democracy  Democracy is defined as “general openness of political institutions”.  The 
variable ranges from 0 (absence of democracy) to 10 (best) 
Monty G. Marshall and Keith 
Jaggers (2002). Polity IV Dataset.  
Ethnicity  Herfindhal index which measure the probability for two individuals to be in 
a different group each other.  
La Porta and al. (1999) 
Infrastructure Quantity  (Stock);  Principal  component analysis on road per km², telephone 
lines per workers, power Gigawatt per worker 
Quality: waiting times for phone com., energy losses, paved road 
Calderon and Serven (2004) 
Tariffs  Import duties comprise all levies collected on goods at the point of entry into 
the country. In % of Imports 
WDI (2004) 
Index Dollar  Index of price distortion  Dollar (1992) 
Index Pritchett  Adjusted Trade ratio: residual once we account for size and distance  Pritchett (1996) 
Index Spilimbergo  Adjusted Trade ratio: residual once we account for size, distance and 
difference in factor endowment 
Spilimbergo and al. (1999) 
Index Leamer  Adjusted Net Trade ratio: residual once we account for size, distance and 
difference in factor endowment 
Leamer (1987) 
Index Hiscox & 
Kastner 
Fixed country years effect in a gravity model once we account for size, 
distance and difference in factor endowment. 
Hiscox & Kastner (2002) 
Black market 
premium 
Black market premium  WDI (2004) 
Index Wacziarg & 
Welch 
Index taking value 0 or 1 depending on liberalization  Wacziarg & Welch (2005) 
Tax Barro & Lee  Tax on capital and input  Barro and Lee (2002) 
(X+M)/Gdp  Output trade ratio  WDI (2004)   41




Let  ift E  is per capita endowment of country i in factor f in year t and 
*
ft E  the world per 
capita effective endowment of country i in factor f in year t , computed by weighting 
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Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1% 
The first column corresponds to the specification from Spilimbergo and al. (1999) 
 
* R-squared “within” 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Econometric 
Specification  OLS OLS  OLS+FE  GLS+FE  GLS+FE 










 Gini  Gini  Gini  Gini  Gini 
       
GDPpc  0.014 0.482 0.528 0.537 1.287 
 (0.05)  (2.09)b  (0.97) (2.18)b  (4.93)a 
GDPpc² -0.004  -0.035  -0.027  -0.025  -0.073 
 (0.25)  (2.63)a  (0.86) (1.84)c  (4.87)a 
       
Capital (K/L)  0.306  0.125  -0.051  -0.013  0.044 
 (4.85)a  (1.83)c  (0.55)  (0.31)  (1.58) 
Arable Land (AT/L)  0.086  0.102  -0.087  -0.090  -0.049 
 (2.50)b  (3.11)a  (0.98) (2.30)b  (1.98)b 
Education (Ed/L)  -0.369  -0.036  -0.320  -0.253  -0.060 
 (2.30)b  (0.19)  (1.76)c (3.65)a  (0.92) 
       
Open  0.027 0.028 0.021 0.013 0.005 
 (3.42)a  (3.30)a  (1.81)c (3.13)a  (0.89) 
       
Open * (K/L)  -0.051  -0.014 -0.001 -0.003 -0.030 
 (4.72)a  (1.34)  (0.18)  (0.84)  (5.15)a 
Open * (AT/L)  -0.013  -0.013  0.007  0.006  0.013 
 (3.10)a  (2.83)a  (0.55) (0.96)  (2.38)b 
Open * (Ed/L)  0.062  -0.001  0.048  0.035  0.018 
 (2.36)b  (0.04)  (2.05)b (4.02)a  (0.72) 
       
SSA  0.299  0.309     
  (6.17)a  (8.07)a     
LAC  0.336  0.267     
  (9.72)a  (7.97)a     
Gross/Net Income    0.028  -0.024  -0.032  -0.021 
   (1.15)  (1.02)  (3.14)a  (2.07)b 
Inc/expenditure    0.111 0.120 0.122 0.135 
    (3.36)a (2.98)a (9.38)a (9.16)a 
Households/Individual    0.033 0.049 0.058 0.026 
   (1.30)  (1.97)c  (7.38)a  (2.29)b 
Fixed  Effects  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 182  202  202  202  202 
R-squared 0.61  0.66  0.20*     
# Countries  56  62  62  62  62   43
Annex 6:  Desegregation in skills and land 
 
  (1) (2)    (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Gini Gini    Gini Gini Gini Gini 
GDPpc 0.1327a  0.0246  GDPpc  0.0653b 0.0814b 0.1074a 0.0779b 
 (3.99)  (0.95)    (2.02) (2.44) (3.32) (2.05) 
(AT/L)  0.0933  -0.0478        
  (1.15)  (0.68)        
      CerLand per Labor  -0.0303      -0.0355 
       (1.38)      (1.49) 
     CroLand  per  Labor    -0.0625b    0.0065 
         (2.23)  (0.16) 
      ForLand per Labor      -0.0438   
           (1.08)   
      (MF/L)  0.1210a 0.1469a 0.1085a 0.1367a 
        (6.14) (7.12) (5.90) (5.24) 
(K/L) -0.0229  -0.0692b  (K/L)  -0.0527 -0.0673c -0.0319 -0.0841b 
 (0.62)  (2.28)    (1.51) (1.94) (0.94) (2.13) 
((NO-ED)/L)  0.0704a    (SK-ED/(BS-ED))  0.1065a 0.1189a 0.0951a 0.1318a 
  (2.72)      (5.13) (5.15) (4.62) (5.42) 
((BS-ED)/L)  -0.0508  0.0080  ((SK+BS)/NO-ED)  -0.1519a -0.1100a -0.1375a -0.1422a 
 (1.23)  (0.26)    (7.88) (5.69) (7.20) (6.33) 
((SK-ED)/L)    0.1221a        
    (6.74)        
           
Tariffs t-5 -0.0139  -0.1559  Tariffs t-5  -0.0530 -0.0793 -0.0546 0.1181 
 (0.04)  (0.58)    (0.21) (0.28) (0.25) (0.33) 
           
(AT/L)*Tariffs t-5 -0.1385  -0.1017        
  (0.41)  (0.37)        
     (CerLand  /Labor)*Tariffs t-5  0.2132    0.2002 
       (0.57)      (0.50) 
     (CroLand/  Labor)*Tariffs t-5   0.1666    -0.0792 
         (0.74)  (0.33) 
     (ForLand/  Labor)*Tariffs t-5     0.0755  
           (0.41)   
     (MF/L)*Tariffs t-5 -0.1907a  -0.1394c  -0.1185  -0.2310a 
        (2.64) (1.93) (1.53) (3.01) 
(K/L)*Tariffs t-5 -0.4864a  0.2007  (K/L)*Tariffs t-5 -0.2219c  -0.1683  -0.2763b  -0.1490 
 (4.54)  (1.53)    (1.73) (1.33) (2.06) (1.07) 
((NO-ED)/L)*Tariffs t-5 -0.2738    (SK-ED/(BS-ED))*Tariffs t-5  -0.9231a -1.0468a -0.8580a -1.1334a 
  (0.78)      (5.22) (5.71) (4.99) (5.61) 
((BS-ED)/L)*Tariffs t-5 0.8681a  0.3389  ((SK+BS)/NO-ED)*Tariffs t-5 1.1404a 1.0335a 1.0867a 1.1537a 
 (2.74)  (1.42)    (6.58) (6.20) (6.15) (6.54) 
((SK-ED)/L)*Tariffs t-5    -0.6887a        
    (4.96)        
           
Inflation 0.0250a  0.0153b  Inflation  0.0082  0.0182a  0.0116  0.0109 
 (3.43)  (2.22)    (1.10) (3.02) (1.63) (1.40) 
gross/net income  -0.0167  -0.0331a  gross/net income  -0.0203c  -0.0038  -0.0175  -0.0211c 
 (1.49)  (4.20)    (1.73) (0.36) (1.63) (1.70) 
income/expenditure  0.1238a 0.1129a  income/expenditure  0.0969a 0.0969a 0.1086a 0.0966a 
 (8.41)  (9.45)    (5.98) (8.44) (6.52) (5.93) 
Households/individual 0.0488a  0.0577a  Households/individual  0.0370a 0.0343a 0.0432a 0.0353a 
 (7.02)  (13.44)    (4.41) (5.28) (7.58) (3.51) 
Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  198 198  Observations  194 194 198 194 
#  Countries  61 61  #  Countries  60 60 61 60   44
Annex 7a:  Relative Factor Endowments: percentile distribution 
 
 
























    













NO-ED/L BS-ED/L SK-ED/L 
210 25 0,365 0,481 0,000 0,650 0,536 0,505 0,717 0,406 
 50  0,943 0,934 0,171 0,927 1,134 0,937 1,008 1,129 
 75  2,473 1,636 1,065 1,285 2,928 1,309 1,321 1,863 
Variable Percentile  5 percentage point 
tariff reduction* 
(K/L)  0.25  -1.3 
  0.75  0.9 
(AT/L)  0.25  0.0 
  0.75  -0.3 
(MF/L)  0.25  -3.3 
  0.75  -0.1 
(SK-ED/BS-ED)  0.25  -2.0 
  0.75  1.0 
((SK+BS)/NO-ED)  0.25  3.2 
  0.75  -5.9 
((NO-ED)/L)  0.25  -3.0 
  0.75  0.1 
((BS-ED)/L)  0.25  0.5 
  0.75  -1.0 
((SK-ED)/L)  0.25  -1.7 
 0.75  2.8   45
Annex 8:  Adding macro and institutional variables as control 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Gini  Gini  Gini  Gini 
GDPpc 0.0892a  0.1240a  -0.1279a  -0.1926a 
  (2.80) (3.60) (2.75) (4.19) 
(AT/L) -0.0452  -0.0538  -0.0471  -0.0372 
  (0.56) (0.61) (0.70) (0.49) 
(MF/L)  0.1039a 0.1053a 0.1387a 0.0604c 
  (6.34) (4.51) (5.03) (1.96) 
(K/L) -0.0343  -0.0592  0.0402  0.0034 
  (1.01) (1.58) (1.12) (0.10) 
(SK-ED/(BS-ED)) 0.0973a  0.0776a  0.0495b  0.0489b 
  (4.90) (3.73) (2.32) (2.56) 
((SK+BS)/NO-ED) -0.1345a  -0.1214a  -0.1033a  -0.0395b 
  (7.61) (6.28) (5.35) (2.02) 
      
Tariff t-5 -0.0430  0.1262  0.1322  0.4484c 
  (0.16) (0.40) (0.50) (1.70) 
      
(AT/L)*Tariff st-5 0.1123  0.0105  -0.2449  -0.3567 
  (0.34) (0.03) (0.76) (1.11) 
(MF/L)*Tariffs t-5 -0.1577b  -0.1861b  -0.3160a  -0.3113a 
  (2.12) (2.34) (4.79) (2.90) 
(K/L)*Tariffs t-5 -0.2400b  -0.2968b  -0.0099  0.3017b 
  (1.98) (1.97) (0.08) (2.27) 
(SK-ED/(BS-ED))*Tariffs t-5 -0.8783a  -0.8483a  -0.5892a  -0.6153a 
  (5.38) (5.80) (3.94) (4.37) 
((SK+BS)/NO-ED)*Tariffs t-5  1.0277a 1.0890a 0.9989a 0.5212a 
  (6.10) (6.84) (7.07) (3.54) 
      
Inflation 0.0086  0.0154b  0.0100  0.0163 
  (1.20) (2.11) (1.35) (1.54) 
Civil  Liberties  0.0472a 0.0448b 0.0606a 0.0617a 
  (2.63) (2.39) (2.75) (2.74) 
Gov. Expenditures (%Gdp)    -0.0286  -0.0516b  -0.0499b 
   (1.03)  (1.98)  (2.25) 
Infrastructure stock      0.1281a  0.1405a 
     (5.52)  (6.15) 
Infrastructure quality      -0.0251a  -0.0295a 
     (3.96)  (4.52) 
Financial  depth  (M2/Gdp)      -0.0097 
      ( 0 . 5 1 )  
gross/net income  -0.0125  -0.0080  -0.0308a  -0.0457a 
  (1.13) (0.75) (2.72) (4.16) 
income/expenditure  0.1083a 0.1102a 0.1025a 0.1228a 
  (6.72) (10.28) (8.40)  (7.43) 
Households/individual  0.0419a 0.0272a 0.0481a  0.0175 
  (8.22) (3.51) (4.68) (1.37) 
Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  198 187 172 138 
#  Countries  61 58 53 43   46
Annex 9:  Using different measures of Trade Openness 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
  Hisc & Kast  BMP  Wacziarg 
Welch 
(XM/Gdp) Spilim.  Prichett 
 Gini  Gini  Gini  Gini  Gini  Gini 
GDPpc 0.2139a  0.1412a  0.1083a  0.0876a  0.1052a  0.1480a 
 (5.03)  (5.02)  (3.78)  (3.66) (3.52)  (5.38) 
            
(AT/L) -0.1000b  -0.0370  -0.0629b  0.2723a  -0.0745c  -0.0611b 
 (1.97)  (1.27)  (2.04)  (2.75) (1.79)  (2.31) 
(MF/L) 0.0680  0.0391  0.1093a  -0.0672  0.0014  0.0639b 
 (1.25)  (1.11)  (5.94)  (0.93) (0.04)  (2.22) 
(K/L) -0.1278b  -0.0402  -0.0425  0.1022  0.0729  -0.0605c 
 (2.03)  (1.21)  (1.24)  (1.35) (1.54)  (1.83) 
(SK-ED/BS-ED) 0.1479a  0.0156  0.0440b  -0.1327  -0.0939c  0.0124 
 (3.90)  (0.61)  (2.32)  (1.27) (1.68)  (0.81) 
((SK+BS)/NO-ED) -0.1449a  -0.0380b -0.0728a  -0.0790  -0.1332a -0.0303b 
 (2.78)  (2.10)  (4.60)  (0.98) (3.61)  (2.43) 
            
Opent-5  0.0009  -0.0116a 0.0483a 0.0206 0.0058  0.0202 
 (0.64)  (3.81)  (3.01)  (0.79) (0.90)  (0.83) 
            
(AT/L)*Open t-5  0.0022c  -0.0011 0.0241  -0.0700a  0.0017 0.0124 
 (1.67)  (0.20)  (1.54)  (3.06) (0.28)  (0.40) 
(MF/L)*Open t-5 -0.0006  0.0031b -0.0123b  0.0302 0.0043  0.0004 
 (0.49)  (2.55)  (2.41)  (1.61) (0.86)  (0.02) 
(K/L)*Open t-5 -0.0010  -0.0097a 0.0267c  -0.0395b -0.0210a  -0.0879a 
 (0.63)  (3.20)  (1.93)  (2.42) (4.32)  (4.71) 
(SK-ED/BS-ED)*Open t-5  -0.0036a  0.0037  -0.0415b  0.0388  0.0241a 0.1588a 
 (2.70)  (0.61)  (2.04)  (1.56) (2.75)  (4.31) 
((SK+BS)/NO-ED)*Open 
t-5 
0.0029b  -0.0022  0.0330c  0.0087  0.0154a 0.0491c 
 (2.01)  (0.52)  (1.91)  (0.43) (3.03)  (1.76) 
            
Inflation 0.0240a  0.0220a  0.0156c  0.0111c  0.0100  0.0200a 
 (3.16)  (3.54)  (1.86)  (1.71) (1.37)  (4.31) 
gross/net income  -0.0046  -0.0253a  -0.0254a  -0.0213b  -0.0183c  -0.0195b 
 (0.39)  (2.92)  (3.00)  (2.54) (1.87)  (2.19) 
income/expenditure 0.1105a  0.1198a  0.1076a  0.1035a  0.1108a  0.1278a 
 (5.32)  (7.24)  (6.25)  (6.13)  (6.26)  (10.05) 
household/individual 0.0443a  0.0504a 0.0627a  0.0477a  0.0674a 0.0590a 
 (3.54)  (4.13)  (5.98)  (4.19) (6.47)  (5.79) 
Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 192  188  231  228  228  212 
# Countries  55  56  69  68  68  63 
 
Notes: 
Signes under indicators in cols. (1) and (2) to be interpreted like those for tariffs.  
Signes under indicators in cols. (3)-(6) to be interpreted in opposite to tariffs 
Figures in bold correspond to those obtained with the tariff measure.  
Figures in italics are opposite to those obtained with tariffs 
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Column (6) corresponds to the specification of table 5 (column 7) but with the smaller sample of countries 
Figures in bold correspond to those obtained with the Gini measure.  
Figures in italics are opposite to those obtained with the Gini measure 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  lnQuint1 lnQuint2 lnQuint3 lnQuint4 lnQuint5  Gini 
GDPpc -0.0586  0.0478  0.0534  0.0411c  -0.0842b  0.1905a 
  (0.63) (0.89) (1.51) (1.75) (2.18) (4.34) 
(AT/L) -0.6083b  -0.6566a  -0.0208  -0.0186  0.2517a  -0.0831 
  (2.40) (4.18) (0.22) (0.36) (2.75) (0.69) 
(MF/L) 0.1595b  0.0236  0.0536  -0.0238  0.0054  0.1173a 
  (2.31) (0.35) (1.64) (1.14) (0.15) (4.86) 
(K/L) -0.1108  -0.0530  -0.0650c  -0.1010a  0.0976b  -0.0623 
  (1.22) (0.80) (1.88) (3.59) (2.57) (1.24) 
(SK-ED/BS-ED) -0.0348  -0.0064  -0.1236a  0.0474a  0.0216  0.0933a 
  (0.70) (0.17) (7.62) (2.70) (1.37) (4.22) 
((SK+BS)/NO-ED) 0.0991a  0.0859b  0.0626a  0.0112  -0.0437b  -0.1657a 
  (2.76) (2.23) (3.95) (0.80) (2.48) (7.11) 
Tariffs t-5  1.5135c -1.3592a -0.2337 -0.3170 0.3220 1.1621a 
  (1.71) (2.87) (0.71) (1.29) (1.09) (3.15) 
(AT/L)*Tariffs t-5 0.8410  2.5443a  -0.0993 0.1128 -0.4616  -0.7482c 
  (0.95) (3.70) (0.23) (0.43) (1.07) (1.85) 
(MF/L)*Tariffs t-5  -3.5200a  -0.6164 0.2850  -0.4164b  0.4475  -1.0352a 
  (5.00) (1.31) (0.99) (2.30) (1.60) (3.20) 
(K/L)*Tariffs t-5  3.3993a 1.7264a  0.2137 0.1244  -0.8531a -0.0810 
  (11.44)  (8.35) (1.52) (1.17) (9.71) (0.65) 
(SK-ED/(BS-ED))*Tariffs t-5 -0.1468  -0.2464  0.4925a -0.3551b  0.1777  -0.9173a 
  (0.37) (0.93) (2.63) (2.31) (1.35) (5.86) 
((SK+BS)/NO-ED)*Tariffs t-5  -1.5432a -1.8995a  -0.2970 -0.1919 0.6464a 1.6716a 
  (2.95) (5.23) (1.46) (1.41) (3.44) (8.41) 
Inflation -0.0561a  -0.0693a  0.0208  0.0039  0.0021  0.0397a 
  (4.53) (2.85) (0.84) (0.28) (0.17) (3.34) 
household/individual -0.0599  -0.0112  0.0515a  0.0744a  -0.0319a  0.0080 
  (1.52) (0.57) (4.41) (9.89) (2.72) (0.71) 
Income/expenditure 0.1539b  -0.1574  -0.1755a  -0.0318  0.0530  0.1372a 
  (2.11) (1.51) (3.17) (1.43) (1.26) (7.17) 
Gross/net income  -0.1138a  0.0271  0.0705  -0.0401a  -0.0236  0.0384a 
  (2.63) (0.27) (1.32) (2.84) (0.58) (2.75) 
Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  135 135 135 135 135 135 
#  Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45   48
Annex 11:  Inequality, factor endowments and openness (full results of table 6) 
 
 lnθ1 lnθ2 lnθ3 lnθ4 lnθ5 lnθ6 lnθ7 lnθ8 lnθ9 lnθ10 lngini  lntheil 
Tariffst-5  12.1665a 5.0987a 2.3205a 1.4353a 1.0290a  0.3309  -0.1210 -0.4606a  -0.6598a -0.1584 -1.2703a  -2.0205a 
 (7.23)  (7.88)  (5.33)  (5.28)  (3.78) (1.46) (0.80) (3.91) (4.12) (0.44) (4.26) (2.85) 
Mean  income  -0.2431a -0.1385a -0.1121a -0.0691a -0.0685a -0.0646a -0.0533a -0.0441a -0.0284a  0.1398a  0.1181a  0.2615a 
 (5.41)  (9.27)  (6.61)  (8.23)  (11.32)  (10.96)  (10.57) (15.83)  (6.08)  (14.43) (12.23) (11.37) 
(K/L)  0.4322a 0.2548a 0.1208b 0.1051a 0.1058a 0.0993a 0.0495a 0.0605a 0.0420a -0.2006a -0.1481a  -0.3366a 
 (4.47)  (6.10)  (2.56)  (4.22)  (6.00) (5.93) (3.37) (8.17) (3.62) (8.15) (4.71) (4.89) 
(AT/L) 0.5842  0.1547  0.2295b  0.2269a 0.2558a 0.3906a 0.4175a 0.3923a 0.1908a -0.6960a -0.3510a  -1.0171a 
 (1.52)  (1.06)  (2.02)  (2.85)  (3.57) (6.74)  (10.56)  (11.50)  (3.27) (7.59) (3.88) (4.87) 
(MF/L)  -0.6935a -0.2021a -0.0904c  -0.0648 -0.0895b -0.0839a -0.1192a -0.0363a  -0.0146  0.1801a  0.1398a  0.3388a 
 (3.90)  (3.05)  (1.72)  (1.45)  (2.25) (3.19) (6.41) (2.89) (1.22) (4.45) (4.40) (4.42) 
(SK-ED/BS-ED)  -0.0676 -0.0362  -0.0342c  -0.0168 0.0050 -0.0074 -0.0023 -0.0030 0.0332a  0.0080  0.0089  0.0012 
 (0.98)  (1.62)  (1.80)  (1.00)  (0.33) (0.73) (0.26) (0.39) (4.17) (0.37) (0.46) (0.03) 
((SK+BS)/NO-ED)  0.1776b 0.1308a 0.0826a 0.0368c 0.0321c 0.0349a 0.0383a  0.0065 -0.0329a -0.0608a -0.0633a -0.1184b 
 (2.35)  (4.49)  (3.24)  (1.68)  (1.91) (4.03) (4.80) (0.97) (5.09) (2.82) (3.24) (2.57) 
(K/L) * (Tariffst-5) 3.6249a  1.3255a  0.6735a  0.3952a  0.1815  -0.0547  -0.1830a  -0.3809a  -0.3279a  0.3056c  -0.2167  -0.0817 
 (5.73)  (4.93)  (3.85)  (3.03)  (1.48) (0.62) (2.88) (8.14) (4.73) (1.94) (1.56) (0.26) 
(AT/L) * (Tariffst-5)  -9.8692a -4.1584a -1.9019a -0.8356a -0.7953a  -0.3312  -0.1689  0.1535c  0.4179a  0.4309  1.1732a  2.0583a 
 (5.75)  (6.60)  (4.21)  (2.99)  (2.72) (1.59) (1.05) (1.88) (2.88) (1.59) (4.07) (2.97) 
(MF/L) * (Tariffst-5)  -0.2151 0.0497 0.0154 -0.0533  -0.0012 0.0028 0.0363 0.0112 -0.0664 -0.0371 -0.0361  -0.1255 
 (0.45)  (0.28)  (0.13)  (0.66)  (0.02) (0.05) (0.65) (0.24) (1.31) (0.43) (0.43) (0.64) 
(SK/(BS-ED)) * (Tariffst-5) 2.4942a  0.9503b  0.7164a  0.2813  0.0520  -0.0596  -0.0495 -0.0163 -0.0299 -0.6451a  -0.8820a  -1.8815a 
 (3.66)  (2.51)  (2.76)  (1.44)  (0.34) (0.67) (0.59) (0.22) (0.36) (5.14) (5.86) (5.43) 
((SK+BS)/NO-ED)*( Tariffst-5)  -2.1938a -0.8410a -0.6382a  -0.2377  -0.1932  -0.1861b -0.2606a -0.1094b -0.1267c  0.5939a  0.6060a  1.3169a 
 (3.26)  (2.96)  (2.64)  (1.34)  (1.30) (2.51) (3.49) (2.35) (1.87) (3.34) (3.13) (3.10) 
Inflation  -0.1110b  -0.0449a -0.0142 -0.0210b  -0.0150c -0.0010 0.0095b 0.0076a  0.0063  0.0148c 0.0240a 0.0494b 
 (2.45)  (2.78)  (1.13)  (2.11)  (1.86) (0.16) (2.16) (3.09) (0.84) (1.67) (2.70) (2.56) 
Income/expenditure  -0.1214a  -0.1069a  -0.0588a  -0.0456a  -0.0191c  0.0015 0.0087 0.0030 0.0031 0.0217c  0.0385a  0.0897a 
 (2.83)  (5.57)  (4.74)  (4.19)  (1.74) (0.15) (1.15) (0.55) (0.48) (1.65) (4.12) (3.96) 
Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 
#  Countries  55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%   49
Annex 12:  Inequality, factor endowments and openness (adding democracy and government expenditure) 
 
 
 lnθ1 lnθ2 lnθ3 lnθ4 lnθ5 lnθ6 lnθ7 lnθ8 lnθ9 lnθ10 lngini  lntheil 
Tariffst-5  14.2378a 5.3814a 2.4655a 1.2369a  0.5164  -0.2524  -0.3386 -0.6646a -0.2578  0.4735  -0.6193 -0.7905 
  (6.91) (7.48) (5.76) (2.78) (1.30) (0.89) (1.53) (6.32) (1.39) (0.97) (1.36) (0.86) 
Mean  income  -0.2533a -0.0877a -0.0640a -0.0491a -0.0586a -0.0660a -0.0498a -0.0445a  -0.0046  0.1303a  0.0894a  0.2136a 
  (5.45) (4.64) (4.45) (3.44) (4.88) (9.06) (8.26) (7.69) (0.74) (8.37) (6.25) (7.19) 
(K/L)  0.7760a 0.2264a  0.0720c 0.0340  0.0403 0.0333c  0.0402b  0.0731a  0.0651a  -0.1173a  -0.0823b  -0.2068b 
  (6.43) (4.05) (1.73) (0.93) (1.31) (1.74) (2.47) (4.61) (4.07) (2.74) (2.14) (2.54) 
(AT/L)  1.8901a 0.3557c 0.1884  0.1611 0.2866a  0.3886a  0.2847a 0.2859a -0.1355b -0.5305a  -0.4416a  -0.9815a 
  (4.45) (1.77) (1.34) (1.26) (2.59) (5.25) (4.82) (6.61) (2.05) (3.25) (2.91) (2.90) 
(MF/L)  -0.8563a -0.1770b  -0.1273a -0.0407  -0.0432 -0.0415c  -0.0586a -0.0158  0.0012  0.0917b 0.0712b 0.1740b 
  (5.65) (2.56) (3.21) (1.08) (1.39) (1.78) (3.07) (1.18) (0.05) (2.39) (2.22) (2.53) 
(SK-ED/BS-ED)  0.2773a 0.0153 0.0044 0.0161 0.0134 -0.0051  -0.0041  -0.0115  -0.0043 0.0160 0.0129 0.0353 
  (2.94) (0.56) (0.18) (0.73) (0.72) (0.36) (0.35) (1.62) (0.38) (0.54) (0.39) (0.51) 
((SK+BS)/NO-ED)  -0.2630a  0.0168 0.0197 -0.0035  -0.0025 0.0181  0.0216c  0.0076 0.0079 -0.0412  -0.0199  -0.0574 
  (2.71) (0.46) (0.70) (0.13) (0.11) (1.21) (1.65) (0.96) (0.63) (1.40) (0.59) (0.84) 
(K/L) * (Tariffst-5)  3.0953a  1.2518a  0.6104a  0.2913b  0.0407  -0.1484c -0.2519a -0.4127a -0.2884a  0.4943a  0.0535  0.4326 
  (4.42) (4.63) (3.74) (2.04) (0.35) (1.79) (3.19) (7.76) (3.72) (2.74) (0.33) (1.18) 
(AT/L) * (Tariffst-5) -10.4122a  -4.5792a  -2.1675a  -1.0689a  -0.7656b  -0.1613  -0.0119  0.3394a  0.2285  0.0743  0.9123b  1.5211c 
  (5.18) (7.24) (5.44) (2.97) (2.34) (0.68) (0.06) (5.07) (1.18) (0.20) (2.21) (1.83) 
(MF/L) * (Tariffst-5)  -0.2037 0.1767  0.0963  0.0403 0.1173b 0.0877  0.0499 -0.0024 -0.0940 -0.0469  -0.1690b  -0.3116c 
  (0.58) (1.50) (1.11) (0.51) (2.03) (1.45) (0.81) (0.06) (1.57) (0.50) (2.11) (1.71) 
(SK/(BS-ED)) * (Tariffst-5)  0.3677  1.4197a 0.9150a 0.5642a 0.3859a 0.1584c  0.0019  -0.1582 -0.0019 -0.5592c  -0.9422a  -1.9033a 
  (0.43) (3.75) (4.89) (5.22) (3.30) (1.71) (0.02) (1.36) (0.01) (1.93) (4.29) (3.31) 
((SK+BS)/NO-ED)*( Tariffst-5)  0.5490  -0.6342b -0.5323b -0.3350c -0.3603b -0.4076a -0.2585b -0.1758b  -0.1831  0.5151c  0.4773b  1.0982b 
  (0.71) (2.08) (2.48) (1.79) (2.27) (3.64) (2.30) (2.48) (1.60) (1.85) (1.98) (2.10) 
Democracy  0.0059 -0.0037c  -0.0007 -0.0013 0.0006 0.0030b 0.0005 0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0021 -0.0014  -0.0033 
  (0.61) (1.78) (0.40) (0.69) (0.35) (2.23) (0.50) (1.41) (0.17) (0.95) (0.85) (0.96) 
Government expenditure  -0.5335a  -0.1611a  -0.1151a  -0.0705a  -0.0523b  -0.0493b  0.0021  0.0155  0.0559a  0.0756a  0.0639a  0.1277a 
  (6.17) (5.68) (5.44) (2.63) (2.07) (2.46) (0.15) (1.28) (4.01) (2.86) (2.93) (2.97) 
Inflation -0.3836a  -0.0764a  -0.0260  -0.0085  -0.0089  0.0038  0.0073  0.0054  0.0215c  0.0041  0.0275b  0.0586b 
  (6.40) (4.32) (1.46) (0.53) (0.73) (0.41) (1.39) (1.37) (1.96) (0.35) (2.06) (2.04) 
Income/expenditure 0.1206a  -0.0295  -0.0899a  -0.0652a  -0.0372b  -0.0126  0.0056  0.0015  -0.0178a  0.0452a  0.0538a  0.1179a 
  (3.45) (1.15) (3.41) (2.72) (2.17) (0.91) (0.56) (0.31) (3.10) (2.73) (2.61) (2.74) 
Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 
#  Countries  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses   
c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%  50
Annex 13:  List of countries for the three regions and their average endowments used 
for calculation of the impact of a 5 points decrease in tariffs on inequality and poverty. 
 
 
•  Sub-Saharan Africa (expect South Africa) 
 
List of countries: 
Ghana, Lesotho, Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe 
 
 
Variables  # Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev 
K/L 10  -2.63  0.90 
AT/L 10  0.68  0.12 
MF/L 10  0.04  0.08 
SK/(BS-ED) 10  -1.73  0.32 
(SK+BS)/NO-ED 10  -1.02  0.52 
 
 
•  Latin America 
 
List of countries: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela 
 
 
Variables  # Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev 
K/L 43  -0.23  0.46 
AT/L 43  0.81  0.41 
MF/L 43  0.79  1.37 
SK/(BS-ED) 43  0.02  0.34 
(SK+BS)/NO-ED 43  -0.12  0.56 
 
 
•  East, South and South-East Asia (except Japan and Singapore) 
 
List of countries: 
Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka 
and Thailand 
 
Variables  # Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev 
K/L 27  -1.01  0.87 
AT/L 27  0.44  0.21 
MF/L 27  0.27  0.35 
SK/(BS-ED) 27  -0.09  0.58 
(SK+BS)/NO-ED 27  0.06  0.98   51
 
Annex 14:  The evaluation of a 5 points decrease in tariffs on income distribution for three regions (full results of table 7) 
 
•  Sub-Saharan Africa (expect South Africa)       [0.464, 0.453]** 
 
Ghana (2)*, Lesotho (2), Kenya (2), Uganda (2), and Zimbabwe (2) 
 
    Share 1  Share 2  Share 3  Share 4  Share 5  Share 6  Share 7  Share 8  Share 9  Share 10 
A  1.9% - 2.5%  2.9% - 3.2%  3.9% - 4.1%  4.8% - 4.8%  5.8% - 5.7%  7.1% - 7.0%  8.7% - 8.4%  11.2% - 10.8%  15.6% - 15.2%  38.0% - 38.4% 








C  -2.7% -1.0% -0.7% -0.1% 0.2%  0.1%  0.4%  0.4%  0.3%  -0.1% 
 
•  Latin America        [0.482, 0.492]** 
 
Argentina (3), Bolivia (3), Brazil (3), Colombia (3), Costa Rica (3), Dominican Republic (3), Ecuador(3), Jamaica (3), Mexico (3), Nicaragua (2), Panama (3), Paraguay (2), Peru 
(3), Uruguay (3) and Venezuela (3) 
 
A  1.3% - 1.0%  2.5% - 2.3%  3.6% - 3.5%  4.6% - 4.5%  5.8% - 5.7%  7.2% - 7.2%  9.0% - 8.9%  11.6% - 11.7%  16.6% - 16.8%  38.0% - 38.3% 















C  2.0% 0.8% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0%  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1% 
 
•  East, South and South-East Asia (except Japan and Singapore)        [0.358, 0.369]** 
 
Bangladesh (2), China (2), India (3), Indonesia (2), Korea (3), Malaysia (3), Pakistan (3), Philippines (3), Singapore (3), Sri Lanka (3) and Thailand (3) 
 
A  3.0% - 2.5%  4.3% - 3.9%  5.2% - 5.0%  6.1% - 5.9%  7.1% - 6.8%  8.2% - 8.2%  9.6% - 9.5%  11.6% - 11.7%  15.1% - 15.2%  29.6% - 29.9% 






C  2.1% 0.9% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1%  0.0%  -0.1%  -0.1% 
Row A corresponds to the relative shift of the share due to a 5 points decrease of tariffs.  
Row B corresponds to the shift of the absolute income of the share due to a 5 points decrease of tariffs. 
Row C shows the corresponding annual real growth (over the 10 years) that would be necessary to keep each decile’s income at its initial value. 
*Number of observations in parentheses. ** Gini coefficients before and after simulated tariff reduction in brackets. 